Rankings upon rankings – and no end in sight Discussion of “Quantitative and Qualitative Rankings of Scholars” by Rost and Frey by Backes-Gellner, Uschi
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273373 
 
 
Department of Business Administration 
 
 
 
 
UZH Business Working Paper Series 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 378 
 
Rankings upon rankings – and no end in sight 
Discussion of “Quantitative and Qualitative  
Rankings of Scholars” by Rost and Frey 
 
Uschi Backes-Gellner 
 
January 2011 
 
 
 
University of Zurich, Plattenstrasse 14, CH-8053 Zurich, 
http://www.business.uzh.ch/forschung/wps.html 
Published as: “Rankings upon Rankings - and no End in Sight - Discussion of 
"Quantitative and Qualitative Rankings of Scholars" by Rost and Frey." 
Schmalenbach Business Review, 63(2011)1: 99-108. By Uschi Backes-Gellner. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273373 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UZH Business Working Paper Series 
Contact Details 
 
 
 
Uschi Backes-Gellner 
University of Zurich  
Department of Business Adminstration  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273373 
 
Uschi Backes-Gellner  
 
Rankings upon rankings – and no end in sight 
 
Discussion of 
 
Katja Rost and Bruno S. Frey: Quantitative and Qualitative Rankings of 
Scholars 
 
 
Katja Rost and Bruno S. Frey address an important topic. They compare 
two kinds of rankings, a conventional allegedly „quantitative“ publication 
ranking, and a ranking based on the membership on editorial boards of 
academic journals, which they call „qualitative“. They find that the rela-
tion between the two rankings is not linear, but inversely u-shaped. Con-
sequently, they argue that maximizing publication rankings may lead to a 
decline in research quality. Therefore, basing promotion decisions solely 
on publication rankings could be counterproductive for science and 
hence should be avoided. 
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The importance of Rost/Frey’s topic for the scientific community is indis-
putable, and the implied conclusion that promotion decisions should not 
be based solely on publication rankings is just as clear. But the im-
portance and the conclusion are presumably the only points of consen-
sus. The proposed new ranking, the empirical study, and the implicit as-
sumptions on which their analysis is based are all controversial, and 
must be evaluated more critically. In what follows, I single out three 
points that I believe are to be seen critically: Are publication rankings 
rightfully called „quantitative“, given that rankings based on the member-
ship on editorial boards are supposedly „qualitative“? Is the proposed 
new indicator „number of board memberships“ better for research pro-
gress than the criticized indicator „number of publications“?  Would it be 
better to refrain from rankings in general? Other authors might empha-
size further points or perhaps choose entirely different ones, but such 
differing views are only natural, given the function of, and heavy discus-
sions on, rankings. Since there will never be definitive answers, our ob-
jective can only be open and rational discussion. Therefore, I would first 
of all like to thank the Schmalenbach Business Review for having en-
couraged this discussion. 
 
Are publication rankings even rightfully called „quantitative“. given 
that rankings based on the membership on editorial boards are 
supposedly „qualitative“?  
 
The title of the essay suggests a comparison between quantitative and 
qualitative rankings.1 Therefore, we must first ask whether the new rank-																																																								1	Rost/Frey do concede that „...quantitative and qualitative rankings are not strictly separable, 
since both contain elements of the other. The distinction is made solely for clarity ...“ (S. 4). 
However, throughout the rest of the text it does not prevent them from treating publication 
indicators as if they measured „quantity“, and as if number of board memberships measured 
„quality“.	
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ing proposed by Rost/Frey, which are based on the number of member-
ships on editorial boards, can rightfully be described as „qualitative“, giv-
en that rankings based on the (weighted) number of publications are de-
scribed as „quantitative“. Is this even a true comparison of „quantitative“ 
and „qualitative“ rankings? The answer is quite clearly “no“.  
The act of counting alone suggests that both rankings are in fact quanti-
tative. However each of the two rankings also indisputably contains 
qualitative aspects. In both rankings, the indicators are „quantitative“ in 
nature, but if they are well constructed, they also signify “quality”. Publi-
cation indicators always reflect quality if the number of publications is 
weighted based on journal quality (which should be the standard nowa-
days). Obviously, this is not a perfect way to depict quality. But then 
again, are indicators ever really perfect? The “new” indicator, which 
Rost/Frey call „qualitative“, is also simply a number. The “number” of 
memberships on editorial boards is clearly a quantitative indicator as 
well, and it is limited to measuring a single dimension. At the same time, 
the authors charge the allegedly „quantitative“ publication rankings with 
not adequately considering the qualitative aspects of research activity. 
This accusation is certainly not new, and neither is it completely wrong, 
but it applies in just the same way to Rost/Frey’s so-called „qualitative“ 
ranking. The number of board memberships is also a single dimension, 
and carries only limited quality information. In the end, nothing is perfect. 
Indicators always depict certain dimensions better and others worse. The 
question of which of these dimensions are most important is still unan-
swered. Unfortunately, Rost/Frey do not provide an answer.  
To summarize, I can state at this point that the fundamental difference 
between „quantitative“ and „qualitative“ does not exist in the way that the 
title of the paper of Rost/Frey suggests. Both indicators are simultane-
ously quantitative and qualitative, and both have their own specific ad-
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vantages and disadvantages. Consequently, the relevant research ques-
tion is not whether an indicator can depict all performance dimensions 
perfectly, but whether certain indicators, given their unique shortcomings, 
are more or less useful for the scientific community. In other words, an 
evaluation of alternative indicators should provide arguments to decide 
which indicator „causes less harm“ or „has more benefits“ to the scientific 
community.  
 
2. Is the proposed new indicator, „number of board memberships“, 
better for the scientific community than the old indicator „number 
of publications“? 
 
The notions of what purpose a ranking should or should not serve and 
what, exactly, a scientific community should accomplish are insurmount-
ably different. Thus, there cannot be a definitive, conclusive answer to 
this question. But we can at least use some objective and generally ap-
plicable criteria for determining the quality of any performance indicator 
to shed some light on the problem, namely we analyze an indicator’s 
scope for manipulation, its multitasking problems, and its potential for 
systematic distortions of results.2 These criteria should be fulfilled in eve-
ry instance because otherwise, applying such performance indicators will 
inevitably cause biased or adverse incentives, which in turn would not be 
favourable to the scientific community as a whole.3  
 
																																																								
2 Rost/Frey mention precisely the same criteria in part of their analysis, but they do not use 
them for a detailed comparison of the two indicators. 
3 For a discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of various performance indi-
cators for professors, see also Pull (2009).  
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Scope for Manipulation 
First, I compare the two indicators regarding the ease with which they 
can be manipulated – i.e., the scope for manipulation – and the resulting 
distortion of incentives.4 A quick comparison of publication indicators and 
board membership indicators concerning the „scope for manipulation“ 
raises doubts as to whether an indicator based on board memberships is 
a better indicator in this dimension. The question is, how easy is it to just 
raise the number of (weighted) publications without any, or with only very 
low cost, and how easy is it to just raise the number of board member-
ships? Is just increasing the indicator cheaper for publications or for 
board memberships? Of course, a comprehensive analysis is not possi-
ble within the scope of this discussion paper. But I can provide some pre-
liminary analyses to indicate how far the two performance indicators may 
be affected by manipulations of the agent (in this case, the researcher). 
In this context it is important to note that this problem becomes especial-
ly important ex post, i.e., once an indicator is known to be used for rank-
ings. Some indicators may have yielded valid performance analyses his-
torically, but the validity of the results is negated once the indicator is 
known to be used for rankings.   
 
So what is the possible extent of a cheap manipulation regarding the 
number of publications or the number of board memberships, respective-
ly? I would argue that the possibility of manipulating the number of publi-
cations is limited, at least for high-quality journals. High quality journals 
will always have a shortage of printing space. Hence, if a journal does 
not want to lose its reputation for quality, it must decide very carefully 
what to accept for print in the limited number of pages they have. Ex-																																																								4	Rost/Frey argue that „Scholars would invariably find ways to „beat the system“. This is un-
doubtedly true, but this makes it essential to ask which indicator allows the least possibility to 
„beat the system“. It seems unlikely that this indicator is the number of editorial board mem-
berships as will be shown in the following.	
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tending the number of journal pages (i.e., extending the number of pages 
per volume or increasing the number of annual issues of a journal is 
usually not feasible, since it causes very high production costs and is an 
indicator of decreasing quality in and of itself. Consequently, journal edi-
tors will avoid allocating some of their already limited pages to a low-
quality paper simply as a favour to some researcher (whether the author 
is a part of an editor’s network or not). So the costs of a manipulative 
publication decision (i.e., accepting a lower-quality paper for a favour) 
are extremely high because every bad paper takes up some of the al-
ready scarce space that could otherwise be used to print high quality pa-
pers. Thus the scope for manipulation is rather small, at least as long as 
publication indicators are quality weighted. 
The situation is entirely different when we consider the scope for manipu-
lation in the number of memberships on editorial boards. The list of 
board members can be extended almost at will without incurring any sig-
nificant costs.  For whatever reason a journal would decide to add an-
other researcher to their editorial board, they would just add another 
name to the list of board members. In the worst case scenario, the 
names of the board members would not fit on the front page anymore 
and the list would have to be continued on the second or third cover 
page, which causes only (if any) negligible additional production costs. 
And the potential loss in reputation caused by adding some more names 
on the front page (or perhaps even the second or third page) is certainly 
substantially lower than the loss in reputation caused by a low-quality 
paper that is undeservedly accepted for publication. Hence, the direct 
and indirect costs of manipulating memberships on editorial boards are 
significantly lower.  
However, it is important to note that Rost/Frey defend the quality of 
board memberships as an indicator by arguing that „A (chief) editor 
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wants to have scholars at hand who help him or her make the best pos-
sible decisions; a disreputable individual or person lacking expert 
knowledge is of little use“. But this argument is at least equally, and 
probably significantly more, valid for the decision on what papers to pub-
lish in a journal. What editor would want to publish a paper with obviously 
lacking quality? So if, as Rost/Frey suggest, the incentives of journal edi-
tors are correct for board memberships, then they should be at least as 
correct for publication decisions. In this respect, the two rankings are not 
systematically different, but fundamentally similar. 
As an easy and by no means final way to test this argument empirically, I 
compare the number of published papers with the number of editorial 
board members over the last few decades in one of the top journals in 
the management field, the Academy of Management Journal. The data 
and the graphs shown in Figure 1 and 2 cover the time span between 
1963 (the first available year in JStor) and 2010 (the last available edi-
tion). 
------------- 
Insert figure 1 and 2 around here 
-------------- 
 
Figure 1 shows that the number of papers has barely increased over the 
last 40 years, and that it fluctuates between 24 and 54 (cf. Fig. 1)5. Fig-
ure 2 shows that the number of editorial board members increases con-
tinually, and towards the end, dramatically, beginning with nine and end-
																																																								
5 I calculated the number of papers per year by multiplying the number of papers in the first 
issue of the year with the number of issues per year. Thus, the graph already accounts for 
the increase of issues per year from four to six in 1993. Here the reader should also note that 
the increase in issues per year does not lead to an increase in the total number of papers per 
year.  
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ing with 159 (cf. Fig. 2).6 This development is not necessarily due to ma-
nipulation, but at the very least it shows that there is great leeway in the 
number of board members. 
 
If we also consider that according to Rost/Frey, the number of board 
memberships is first mentioned in 1991 as a performance indicator for 
researchers (Gibbons/Fish 1991), the results are exactly what we would 
expect according to incentive theory and what I argued in the section 
above: the number of board members should begin to rise in the mid-
1990s, at the very latest, while the number of publications should remain 
more or less constant. 
 
 
Of course one could now argue that it is only difficult to manipulate the 
number of publications in top journals, or at least in high-quality journals. 
Given the increasing number of journals of somewhat questionable quali-
ty that have recently begun to be published, one might say that journal 
pages – and, consequently, the possible number of publications – are 
not really scarce anymore. This increase would imply that publication in-
dicators have also developed more scope for manipulation over time. 
This claim is undoubtedly true, but well-constructed publication rankings 
weigh the number of articles according to journal quality for exactly this 
reason. Some rankings today even go so far as to entirely exclude low-
quality journals in their publication counts. Others raise the convexity of 
the weights towards the upper limit of the journal quality (as it has just 
been done in the Journal Ranking for Economics Journals of the German 
newspaper „Handelsblatt“).  
 																																																								
6 I simply counted the number of editorial board members in each first issue of the year. 
Since the page listing the editorial board members is missing in the JSTOR-Version of issue 
1/1973, I used issue 1/1974 in this case. 
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Therefore, if we use the scope for manipulation as a way to determine 
the quality of a ranking indicator, the number of (weighted) publications is 
certainly a less problematic indicator than the number of board member-
ships.   
 
Multitasking Problems 
A second and important quality criterion for the two ranking indicators is 
the extent of multitasking problems, as already mentioned in Rost/Frey. 
Here, we must carefully compare the multitasking problems that evolve 
while publishing or while being a board member. So what are these oth-
er, multiple tasks, and is it reasonable to assume that the multitasking 
problems are higher for publication rankings as Rost/Frey suggest? Ac-
cording to Rost/Frey, the other tasks are „ (...) teaching, supporting 
young scholars, informing and advising the public, participating in univer-
sity administration, or reading and reviewing the work of other scholars.” 
Without conducting a comprehensive analysis, it is still obvious that 
Rost/Frey’s argument on why publication indicators cause multitasking 
problems also holds for board memberships. 7 For instance, one of the 
problems of publication rankings that Rost/Frey identify is that “a publish-
ing record is easy to measure, but performance on the other tasks is 
not”. This statement is just as true for the number of board memberships, 
because board memberships are also easier to measure than perfor-
mance indicators of other tasks. Furthermore, attempts to maximize 
board membership counts often depend heavily on networking activities 
and on the establishment of personal contacts. These activities certainly 
do not improve performance on the other tasks, such as teaching or 
supporting young scholars. On the contrary, the attempt to maximize 
publication counts is at least somewhat beneficial to other scientific tasks 																																																								
7 Pull (2009) gives a more detailed discussion of multitasking problems when measuring per-
formance of professors.  
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(for example, teaching senior students; see Backes-Gellner/Zander 
(1989), who find a positive correlation between teaching higher-level 
courses and publication output for economics and management profes-
sors in Germany. At the very least maximizing publication counts leads 
to efforts to contribute to the current state of research. The same is hard-
ly true for attempts to maximize personal networks. 
 
Systematic distortion of results 
In comparing the two indicators, we must also ask ourselves whether 
they systematically favour or discriminate against certain groups of sci-
entists, or whether they are more likely to deliver unbiased results. 
Rost/Frey claim that „editorial boards clearly favour established schol-
ars“, but that the same is true for „the number of publications and cita-
tions“. Unfortunately, the authors do not support this statement empirical-
ly. Personally, I would expect the opposite to be true.  Younger genera-
tions have a fair chance of being published – even without a record – if 
their research is of outstanding quality. However, the membership on 
editorial boards clearly favours established scientists and leaves little 
chance for younger scholars, no matter how outstanding they may be.  
This distortion is especially problematic in the context of producing re-
search, because research progress and scientific innovations – like any 
other innovations – rely on new ideas and particularly on tapping the full 
potential of young talents.  Although I also cannot present hard empirical 
evidence, I will use an analogy to empirically support my argument, at 
least provisionally. I use a phenomenon that caused similar distortion 
and which was hardly beneficial for the scientific system. My example is 
presentations at scientific conferences, which became accessible to 
young scholars only after the selection processes for accepting/inviting 
paper presentations were aligned with the acceptance criteria used for 
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papers in scientific journals. The presentations at the yearly conferences 
of the German Economic Association (Verein für Socialpolitik) are well  
documented and serve as an empirical example here. As late as the 
1970s, there were only very few presentations. Selection decisions were 
made by a handful of established professors from a small pool of experts 
and colleagues who were all personally known to one another. Conse-
quently, only very few researchers – all of them professors – ever had a 
chance to present their work. For instance, according to the annual con-
ference proceedings printed in the book series of the German Economic 
Association, of the 19 speakers of the annual conference in 1970 and the 
34 speakers in 1982, every single one was a senior researcher. Young 
researchers, if they were permitted to attend at all, were only allowed to 
listen to the presentations, but not to present. Only after the Association 
opened part of the conference in the 1990s and based its choice of pa-
pers on an anonymous selection process did young scholars have a 
chance to present their work to the broader scientific community. Accord-
ingly, in later years young scholars began to catch up. Between 1997 
and 2002 at least 58% of speakers were young scientists with a diploma 
or Ph.D., while professors only made up about 20% of speakers (Fa-
bel/Lehmann/Warning (2003)).8 Today, the yearly conference of the 
German Economic Association would be inconceivable without all the 
young scholars in the open part of the conference – and scientific pro-
gress undoubtedly and to a large extent depends on this open part of the 
conference. Other examples for this phenomenon include the annual 
meeting of the German Association of Business Economists (Pfingstta-
gung des Hochschullehrerverbandes für BWL) and countless other con-
ferences. Scientific progress would certainly not be able to keep up with 																																																								
8 Bommer/Ursprung (1998) also show that the presentation activities are significantly posi-
tively correlated with publication intensity. In other words, both studies show how much the 
scientific output now depends on young scientists.  
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the pace it has today if all of these conferences were still biased in favor 
of established scholars and against young scholars, as they were in the 
past. 
 
Interpretation of U-shaped Relationship Between Publications and Board 
Memberships 
Finally, the question remains, what we can conclude from Rost/Frey’s 
empirical results on the relation between publications and board mem-
berships (given that their theoretical arguments favouring board mem-
berships over publications are rather unconvincing as shown above). So 
what do we learn from editorial board memberships and from the in-
versely U-shaped relationship Rost/Frey find?  
Rost/Frey claim: „Journals are indeed interested to appoint board mem-
bers who show a constant publication history but they are not interested 
in having board members who show a very large number of publica-
tions“. But the claim that journals are not interested in board members 
with very large number of publications is not supported by the available 
data. To be precise, the inversely U-shaped relationship only tells us that 
researchers who are outstandingly productive are less often members of 
editorial boards than researchers with a lower publication productivity. It 
is unclear whether the outstandingly productive researchers have not 
been asked to participate in a board; or whether they preferred not to 
participate; or whether there is a trade-off regarding time investment, and 
that those who do participate in boards become less productive after-
wards.  As a matter of fact, we do not know whether the empirical results 
originate from the demand side, or from the supply side. Hence, 
Rost/Frey's argument that journals are „ ... not interested in having board 
members who have a very large number of publications" is audacious.  
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However, the good news in this context of an inversely u-shaped relation 
is that researchers with the lowest publication productivity are obviously 
the least likely to participate in editorial boards. In the end, this result 
speaks to the quality of the editorial system as a whole (and in this case, 
it is irrelevant whether scientists with low publication activity were not 
asked or simply did not want to participate, most important is that they 
just did not participate).  
 
What if Editorial Board Memberships Indeed Became a Common Per-
formance Indicator? 
Last but not least, when evaluating the inversely U-shaped relation with 
respect to its consequences for the scientific community, we must ask 
whether it would even be an efficient allocation of resources if outstand-
ingly publishing researchers spent their time on more editorial boards, 
which could happen if there were new and effective incentives for edito-
rial board memberships.  If we assume that the best research talents are 
particularly scarce, and if we further assume that research production 
and research services are substitutes for one another as Rost/Frey im-
plicitly assume in their multitasking argument, then it seems doubtful that 
a redistribution of efforts would be a more efficient allocation of re-
sources. Incentives that stem from publication indicators encourage orig-
inal research production, but at best board memberships only provide 
incentives for an intermediate output. Should this intermediate output be-
come an end in and of itself due to misguided incentives, then member-
ship on editorial boards could easily become a detriment to research 
productivity. In any case, before concluding from the inverted U-shape 
that there are distorting or inefficient incentives (in the upper part of the 
talent distribution) we need to further investigate the allocative problems 
in combination with the incentive effects at hand. 
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3. Is it better to refrain from rankings in general? 
Here I also see a clear “No,” because we (the business researchers 
community) would find ourselves back in the situation where we started 
more than 20 years ago: internationally backward, self-referential, and 
stuck in the past. This is the situation that first engendered the discus-
sion about rankings in Germany, and when the first colloquia and papers 
on measuring research performance and its organizational determinants 
occurred. For instance, a group of (social) scientists at Schloss Reisens-
burg (cf. Fisch/Daniel 1986, Daniel/Fisch 1988) tried to determine why 
German research output had become less and less visible over the years 
and why the distribution of individual research output was so uneven 
across researchers. They analyzed if a lack of objective performance 
measurement led to reduced incentives and declining research output;  
whether research performance was even measurable in general; and 
how,  based on international experience,  a systematic measurement of 
research performance could (or could not) be implemented effectively. 
(For more information see also Backes-Gellner 1987, and Backes-
Gellner/Moog 2003.) Given the situation at the time, the results of these 
discussions were clear and widely accepted: the lack of performance 
measurement did not automatically lead to great research success as 
those who criticized performance measurements sometimes seemed to 
suggest, but the existence of performance measurements did at least 
foster a minimum effort (of course without inhibiting maximum effort and 
great research). Instead, a lack of performance measurement led to vir-
tually inexcusable differences in research output despite nearly identical 
input; it led to an unwillingness to accept external criticism; and it led to 
complacency instead of the desire to continually improve. All these prob-
lems have been extensively described and discussed, and need not be 
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repeated here. An obvious consequence of this discussion was an in-
creased and shared understanding that research performance should, in 
principle, be measurable and that the profession as a whole would have 
to face up to the measurement of their performance – particularly as 
business economists, who spend a significant amount of their time on 
counting and evaluating the performance of others.  
 
Both the business economics profession and the scientific system as a 
whole (especially in the German-speaking countries) have come a long 
way since - and based on measurable results it was the right way to go. 
Today, young scholars are included as a matter of course at confer-
ences; young German-speaking scholars are major contributors of pa-
pers in leading international journals; and appointments to professor-
ships are predominantly based on research output instead of on mem-
bership in „Old Boys Networks“, as was often the case in the past.9 To-
day, researchers expect to have their performance measured just like 
everybody else, and recognize that they cannot completely insulate 
themselves without consequences. In a world in which everything and 
everybody is measured and ranked, it is probably a virtue in and of itself 
that researchers also accept to be evaluated. 
Perhaps, as happens so often when reforms are implemented, the cur-
rent situation with all kinds of rankings being applied everywhere is too 
extreme. But this extreme result cannot mean that we need only revert to 
the old system and hope for everything to improve.  It can only mean that 
we might need to be more careful, that we might need to differentiate 
more precisely, that we might need to consider which rankings should 
serve which purpose, that we might need to weigh different rankings 																																																								
9 The increased population of female researchers among newly appointed professors in re-
cent years, might also be an important side effect of the declining importance of the "old boys 
networks" and the increasing importance of objective criteria such as published research, 
conference presentations, teaching evaluations, etc.  
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against one another, and that we might need to let one ranking comple-
ment the other. In this vein, Rost/Frey’s contribution is highly laudable 
because it introduces a new indicator – membership in editorial boards – 
that certainly also generates valid information. However, I hope that this 
discussion has shown that we should not see their indicator final word on 
rankings, nor should it even be perceived as „better“ than publication 
rankings. 
 
References: 
Backes-Gellner, Uschi (1987) Ökonomie der Hochschulforschung - Or-
ganisationstheoretische Überlegungen und betriebswirtschaftliche 
Befunde. Wiesbaden: Gabler 1989.  
Backes-Gellner, Uschi (1989) "Zum Verhältnis von Forschung und Lehre 
in sozialwissenschaftlichen Fachbereichen." Ökonomie der Hoch-
schule I, (1989), Ed. Christof Helberger. Berlin, München: Duncker 
& Humblot, 51-76.  
Backes-Gellner, Uschi; Petra Moog (2004) Ökonomie der Evaluation von 
Schulen und Hochschulen. Beiträge der Jahrestagung 2003 des 
Bildungsökonomischen Ausschusses. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 
Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik.  
Backes-Gellner, Uschi; Eva Zanders (1989) Lehre und Forschung als 
Verbundproduktion - Data-Envelopment-Analysen und organisati-
onsökonomische Interpretationen der Realität in wirtschaftswissen-
schaftlichen Fachbereichen. In: Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, 
59(1989)3: 271-290.  
Bommer, R., H.W. Ursprung (1998) Spieglein, Spieglein an der Wand. 
Eine publikationsanalytische Erfassung der Forschungsleistungen 
volkswirtschaftlicher Fachbereiche in Deutschland, Österreich und 
der Schweiz. In: Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaf-
ten, 118(1998): 1-28. 
Daniel, H.-D., R. Fisch (Eds.) 1988: Evaluation von Forschung, Kon-
stanz: Universitätsverlag.  
Fabel, Oliver, Erik Lehmann, Susanne Warning (2003) Vorträge als Qua-
litätsindikator: Empirische Evidenz der Jahrestagungen des Ver-
eins für Socialpolitik. In: Backes-Gellner/Schmidtke (Hrsg.) Hoch-
schulökonomie – Analysen interner Steuerungsprobleme und ge-
samtwirtschaftlicher Effekte. Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, S. 13-31. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273373 
Fisch, R.; H.-D. Daniel (Eds.) 1986: Messung und Förderung von For-
schungsleistung. Konstanz: Universitätsverlag.  
Frey, Bruno S. (2007) Evaluierungen, Evaluierungen, ... Evaluitis. Per-
spektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 2008 8(3): 207-220. 
Pull, Kerstin (2009) Risiken und Nebenwirkungen der Leistungsmessung 
von Professoren. DBW 69(2009)3: 311-313. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273373 
 
 
 
 
 
